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OPER ATION EARNEST WILL
The U.S. Foreign Policy behind U.S. Naval Operations in the
Persian Gulf 1987–89; A Curious Case
Andrew R. Marvin

O

n 3 October 2015, the U.S. Navy met an odd milestone when it decommissioned USS Simpson—the last modern ship in its fleet to have sunk an
enemy warship. Simpson had sunk the Iranian ship Joshan twenty-seven years
earlier during an obscure deployment to the Persian Gulf from 1987 to 1989 to
protect eleven Kuwaiti oil tankers and preserve freedom of navigation through
the Strait of Hormuz.
In 1987, when the episode began, the Cold War was hot. Despite ongoing
negotiations over conventional and intermediate nuclear forces, U.S. and Soviet
proxies faced off in Nicaragua and Afghanistan. The Iran-Contra hearings were
about to begin, and the Iran-Iraq War was starting its seventh year. Iraqi and
Iranian forces were sinking neutral oil tankers and other merchant ships moving
cargo through the Strait of Hormuz at an alarming rate.
It was in this environment that President RonAndrew R. Marvin is an operations research analyst
ald W. Reagan authorized the Kuwaiti tankers to
for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
be reflagged as American ships and given a sizable
Prior to his time at DHS, he worked as a national
naval escort, including Simpson. The deployment,
security consultant in IBM’s Advanced Analytics
and Watson practice, where he focused on optimizcode-named Operation EARNEST WILL, stood out
ing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
as the U.S. Navy’s largest and most complicated
platforms. He served eight years as an Army officer
in command and staff functions in field artillery and surface-warfare operation since World War II, and
military intelligence. During that time, he deployed
it was a rare example of the United States using
to Bosnia and Iraq. He is a graduate of Davidson
College and has a master’s degree in public and in- force to protect access to crude oil. EARNEST WILL
ternational affairs from Virginia Tech.
was a contentious deployment, and Congress demanded assurances that U.S. forces, if deployed,
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would be protected, to avoid friendly casualties.
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Participants and historians judge the operation to have been a success, although there has been little counterfactual analysis to ascertain what would
have happened had the United States done nothing.1 We should seek to understand why we deploy forces abroad and evaluate each deployment on whether
it succeeded in achieving its mission. Strategists use many criteria to determine
whether deployments should occur, but minimally these missions should be
moral efforts of last resort when diplomacy has failed (or used in conjunction
with diplomacy) and tied to a nation’s grand strategy.
This grand strategy can take many forms, but generally constitutes “a nationstate’s theory on how to produce security for itself,” or, as Cold War historian
John Lewis Gaddis wrote, “how one uses whatever one has to get to wherever it
is one wants to go.”2 A well-formed strategy must be feasible and have a decent
probability of success. It must be suitable; that is, the strategy, if successful, actually will produce the desired policy goal. Finally, the strategy must be acceptable,
meaning that the nation is willing to bear the cost of the strategy, as measured in
lives, treasure, prestige, and leadership focus.
Given the stakes, one would think that grand strategies and the deployments
that support them are well thought out. This does not seem to be so. Some research suggests that much American strategy has been improvised on the fly.3
Scholars such as Richard Neustadt, Ernest May, and Yuen Khong argue that individual policy decisions, such as particular deployments, are driven by a series of
messy analytic models that include poor analogical thinking instead of structured
analytic techniques.4
The EARNEST WILL deployment is an example of an ad hoc improvisation in
the context of two developed U.S. strategies: the policy of containment and the
Carter Doctrine. As a deployment, it was anomalous because of its size, the ferocity with which it was executed (the American joint task force [JTF] ultimately
sank a large portion of the Iranian navy), and its adoption in the face of congressional opposition. An outlier such as this invites examination. We therefore
should try to understand what strategic forces drove EARNEST WILL. Analysis of
this case study can help us examine what practical realities drive states’ foreign
policies. When faced with multiple principles (such as containment and the
Carter Doctrine), which are the more powerful influencers?
This article assesses two possible drivers. The first is that EARNEST WILL was
executed as an extension of President Reagan’s Cold War strategy. The Soviet
Union had offered to solve the security issues in the Gulf. Keeping the Soviet
Union out meant keeping U.S. forces in, and it also meant pulling Kuwait into
an American-provided security convoy regime. In this explanation, EARNEST
WILL was a shrewd, neorealist example of offshore balancing. A second option is that oil economics was the main driver behind the deployment. The U.S.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss2/8
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State Department’s official policy rationale for EARNEST WILL stated that “the
unimpeded flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz is a vital interest and critical to the economic health of the Western world.”5 The oil had to be protected,
as it all went into the global spot and futures markets, which affected the price
Americans paid at the gas pump. The Carter Doctrine was explicit that this was
a national interest, and in the past, when oil supplies were disrupted, it sent
the U.S. economy reeling. In this situation, the Persian Gulf was a critical piece
of the economic global commons, and the United States was the protector of the
global town green.
THE ROAD TO WAR: THE SHAH, THE HOSTAGES,
AND THE IRAQI INVASION
On 22 September 1980, Iraq commenced a mechanized invasion of Iran with
twenty-two divisions equipped with modern Soviet weapons. Iraqi president
Saddam Hussein thought his force could seize oil fields and the Shatt al Arab
waterway quickly from an Iranian army still in disorder from the 1979 Islamic
Revolution. Hussein also feared that Iran might export its revolutionary brand of
Islam to Iraq’s predominantly Shia population. The Iraqi invasion initially made
good progress; Iran quickly rallied, however, drawing from a deep well of revolutionary fervor and a population three times the size of Iraq’s. For years the ground
war, while not exactly a stalemate, produced no decisive results.
America from the start tilted toward Iraq. Iran’s status in America had shifted
from key strategic partner to terrorist menace. In the 1970s, relations between
the United States and Iran’s monarch, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (the
shah), were warm. The United Kingdom had been the Persian Gulf ’s traditional
protector and offshore balancer for much of the twentieth century, but in 1971
the United Kingdom withdrew from “east of the Suez,” closing its naval base in
Bahrain. With the United States overextended at the time and trying to disengage
from Vietnam, Britain presented the move as a fait accompli.6 Henry Kissinger
recalled the dilemma: “[T]here was no possibility of assigning any American
military forces to the Indian Ocean in the midst of the Vietnam war and its attendant trauma.”7 America filled the void with the Nixon Doctrine, a stratagem that
called for the two pillars of Iran and Saudi Arabia to provide security in the Gulf.
Iran, well funded with petrodollars and well equipped with advanced American
weapons, approached the task with zeal—until the shah’s overthrow in 1979.
America tried to work with the subsequent Ayatollah Khomeini regime, with
the Pentagon announcing shipments of spare parts to the Iranian military as
late as October 1979.8 But in November 1979, Iranian students seized fifty-four
hostages in the U.S. embassy in Tehran in retaliation for the U.S. government
allowing the shah into the United States for medical treatment. In April 1980,
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020
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President Jimmy Carter, perceived by many as overseeing a dovish foreign
policy, launched U.S. special operations forces on an audacious rescue mission
to recover the Americans. Aircraft malfunctions doomed the raid, and eight U.S.
servicemembers died in a collision. The Iranians displayed their bodies and the
destroyed aircraft for the world to see—a spectacle that added to the dual humiliations of deposed ally and captive diplomats. Tehran finally released the hostages
on 20 January 1981, as part of a deal that netted the regime $2.8 billion in assets
previously frozen by the United States.9 In a final affront to President Carter, the
airplane bearing the hostages did not depart Iran until a few minutes after Ronald
Reagan was sworn into office. They had been held captive for 444 days.
Although Saddam Hussein’s decision to invade was unilateral, Iran saw the
attack, which occurred during the American hostage crisis, as part of a wider
effort to bring harm to the country and end the Khomeini revolution. Bruce
Riedel, a former intelligence analyst specializing in the Iran-Iraq War, explains
the thinking:
Iranians call the war the “Imposed War” because they believe the United States
subjected them to the conflict and orchestrated the global “tilt” toward Iraq. They
note that the United Nations [UN] did not condemn Iraq for starting the war. In
fact, the UN did not even discuss the war for weeks after it started, and it ultimately
considered Iraq to be the aggressor only years later, as part of a deal orchestrated by
President George H. W. Bush to free the remaining U.S. hostages held by pro-Iranian
terrorists in Lebanon.10

WAR FOOTING
The “Imposed War” soon required full mobilization of both combatants’ citizenries and economies. One analyst has estimated the total cost of the war to both
economies at $1.097 trillion, and noted that the sum “exceeds by $678.5 billion
the entire oil revenue received by both countries, ever since they started to sell
their oil on the world market.”11
Much of this money went to weapons purchases. In 1980, Iraq imported $2.24
billion worth of weapons, a figure that increased to $3.285 billion by 1982.12 Iran’s
imports were anemic by comparison: $278 million in 1980, when it was in a state
of revolution but still on a peacetime footing, increasing to $541 million by 1982.
In 1983, the United States initiated Operation STAUNCH, an effort to stop the flow
of arms, not to the aggressor but to Iran, on the grounds that the Iranian government would not negotiate a cease-fire. During a hearing to justify EARNEST WILL,
the State Department’s Under Secretary for Political Affairs described STAUNCH,
then in its fourth year of existence, as “vigorous diplomatic efforts—through
intelligence-sharing and strong demarches—to block or complicate Iranian arms
resupply efforts on a worldwide basis.”13
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss2/8
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Oil exports were critical to fuel the war machines of both sides. The war cut off
Iraq’s access to the Persian Gulf, leaving more than seventy merchant ships stuck
in the ports of Umm Qasr, Shatt, and Khorramshahr. Shells and bullets impacted
them and their egress to the Gulf slowly silted up. Insurers eventually wrote off
the trapped ships as constructive total losses and paid out more than $450 million
to various policy holders.14
Baghdad adapted by exporting oil via pipeline and importing weapons and
dry goods overland after off-loading at ports in the United Arab Emirates (UAE)
and Kuwait. Since its navy was small, Iraq used its air force to strike military
and economic targets in the Iranian littorals. Kharg Island, Iran’s major loading
point for crude oil, was a frequent target, and Iran soon fortified the location
with missiles, decoys, and antiaircraft guns in a mode reminiscent of European
cities during World War II. In October 1981, Iraq began using French helicopters
equipped with French Exocet antiship missiles to attack neutral ships heading
for Iran. Tankers loading crude at Kharg were a favorite target, and Iranian oil
revenue suffered.
Iran declared its territorial waters a war zone shortly after the invasion and
stated it would blockade Iraq (both legal moves under the laws of armed conflict), but initially the government did not try to interdict shipping heading
to Iraq. By September 1982, after months of Iraqi attacks on Iranian shipping,
Tehran’s tone changed. That month, speaker of the Iranian parliament Ali Akbar
Hashemi Rafsanjani told the Japanese ambassador, “We care a lot about the security of the Persian Gulf . . . but if others do not leave it safe and want to secure only
their own interest and thereby use it against us, perhaps then we will not let it be
safe for anyone.”15 Iranian rhetoric intensified, but it was not until 13 May 1984,
after dozens of ships servicing Iran were hit, that the Iranian air force retaliated
by putting an American-made Maverick missile into the side of Umm Casbah, a
Kuwaiti oil tanker.16
Denied Iraqi targets, Iran felt justified in targeting third-party shipping, for
two reasons. First, it deduced that Iraq was receiving commercial goods and war
matériel via “neutral” ports, such as those in Kuwait and the UAE. Second, the
Arab Gulf states had tilted openly against Persian (and Shiite-ruled) Iran. During the war, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states gave Iraq between
twenty-five and fifty billion dollars in financial assistance.17 Eight days after the
Umm Casbah attack, the GCC asked the UN Security Council (UNSC) to address Iranian aggression. The UNSC condemned Iranian actions on 1 June 1984,
in UNSC Resolution 552, a document that demanded that there “should be no
interference with ships en route to and from States that are not parties to the
hostilities.” UNSC Resolution 552 made no mention of Iraqi maritime attacks,
which were allowed under the laws of armed conflict, nor did it address Iranian
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020
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grievances about the thin neutrality that GCC members such as Kuwait displayed
during the conflict.
Stymied on the battlefield and geographically isolated in the Gulf, with only
a short list of arms suppliers, Iran must have felt increasingly isolated politically
at this point as well. Additionally, the world’s two superpowers had weighed in
against Iran. The Soviet Union was, of course, Iraq’s number one arms supplier.
By 1984, the United States tilted against Iran in at least two ways. The first was
Operation STAUNCH, its arms-restriction effort. The second was a small deployment of U.S. Air Force jets called ELF-1.
The Iran-Iraq War alarmed Saudi Arabia, which moved most of its oil through
the Persian Gulf. Shiite Iran was a traditional foe of Sunni Saudi Arabia, which
backed Iraq. Saudi Aramco’s massive oil-processing facility and anchorage at
Ras Tanura is 145 kilometers from an Iranian air force base at Bushehr—a mere
fifteen-minute flight time for an Iranian F-4 Phantom. The Saudis requested and
received deployment of American E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning and Control
System (AWACS) aircraft and refueling tankers. E-3s flown by the ELF-1 mission
stood sentinel over Ras Tanura and the western Gulf from October 1980 until the
end of the Iran-Iraq War. The E-3s’ mission was early warning, and the deployment was defensive, but it gave U.S. and Saudi air forces eyes over the battlefield
over a four-hundred-kilometer radius from the aircraft’s orbit.
ESCALATION AND CONTINUED AMERICAN TILTING
TOWARD IRAQ
Iran eventually retaliated by declaring large parts of the Gulf “free fire zones”
and striking an increasing number of tankers and merchantmen with naval and
air forces. In the 1980s, oil was cheap, and a glut of shipping meant crews volunteered to sail the Strait of Hormuz even as the tally of damaged and destroyed
ships grew. Still, economic pressure built with the tempo of the attacks. Fifty
ships were hit in 1985, ninety-seven in 1986.18 During the summer of 1985, Iran
started boarding ships transiting the Gulf as well. The Strait of Hormuz made an
excellent choke point for these operations, as it narrowed to only twenty-three
nautical miles, and most traffic used a much narrower set of shipping lanes. Iran
also controlled the islands of Tunb and Abu Musa, located to the west of the strait,
and observed or launched warships from bases there.
Boarding and inspection were legal under the laws of armed conflict for the
purposes of seizing contraband, which third parties were funneling to Iraq. On
12 January 1986, a crew from an Iranian frigate boarded SS President Taylor,
a U.S. ship in the Gulf of Oman, east of the Strait of Hormuz and outside the
Persian Gulf proper. Taylor was heading to the UAE port of Fujairah to pick up
packaged food aid bound for India. U.S. policy makers initially considered the
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss2/8
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incident “a matter of serious concern,” but later conceded that the search was
legal. Warships escorted subsequent U.S. merchantmen. In May 1986, an Iranian
frigate tried to stop SS President McKinley during a Gulf passage but backed off
when McKinley’s destroyer escort, USS David R. Ray, requested that it do so.19
The United States, long a proponent of freedom of navigation, clearly felt its
ships’ rights to avoid inspection trumped that of Iran to interdict contraband
cargo. Fujairah was known as a transshipment point for cargo heading to Iraq, so
Iran’s inspection efforts in the Gulf of Oman were logical. However, the United
States in 1986, with hostages held by Iranian-backed Shiite militants in Lebanon
and its memory still seared by the detention and torment of the fifty-four diplomats seized in 1979, naturally was reluctant to allow any detention, however
brief, of its mariners by Iran.
During this time, hull insurance rates climbed fivefold for ships heading to
Kuwait. It appeared that Iranian antishipping efforts, while threatening shipping
heading to all GCC countries, were paying particular attention to Kuwait-bound
traffic, including its supertankers. The U.S. defense intelligence establishment
had concluded as much by the fall of 1986.20 The GCC met to discuss the problem and develop protective schemes on 1 November 1986, but it did not reach a
consensus.
Kuwait proved more interested than the others in pursuing alternative solutions to the Iranian antishipping attacks. Admiral William J. Crowe, USN, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1985–89, suggested that Saudi Arabia’s hesitance
to seek an armed solution came from a national culture that preferred quiet diplomacy to resolve disputes, as well as the sheer size of the Saudi oil trade, which
could absorb the loss of the occasional oil tanker.21 In contrast, Crowe suggested
that Kuwait’s oil industry, while rich, was more sensitive to the threat posed to
the Kuwait Oil Tanker Company (KOTC), which was owned by the Kuwaiti royal
family.
David Crist, a historian who wrote an academic history of Operation
EARNEST WILL, argues that Kuwait’s precarious geostrategic position drove it to
seek a military solution to the Iranian threat. Kuwait’s existence as an independent
nation-state was, in the words of a former U.S. ambassador to the country, “an accident of history.”22 Iraq resented Kuwait’s existence. The country had no national
bureaucratic or technical class. Kuwait accepted thousands of Palestinian refugees after 1948. The Palestinians and their children ran much of the nation, while
native-born Kuwaiti Bedouins reaped the benefits of the country’s oil wealth.
As a result, Kuwait felt constantly insecure—“a defenseless state surrounded by
wolves.”23 This encouraged diplomatic hedging. Kuwait was the only Gulf country
with full diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. It bought both Western and
Soviet weapons. It refused to close its embassy in Tehran even after Iran bombed
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020
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the country and marked its merchant shipping for destruction. Of course,
Kuwait—even while this was happening—also was assisting Iraq’s war by transferring weapons from its war stocks to Baghdad, accepting foreign military cargoes (contraband under the laws of armed conflict) and shipping them overland
to Iraq, and extending loans and grants to the financially strapped regime. It is
not surprising, therefore, that in the fall of 1986, the Kuwaiti government approached both the Soviet Union and the United States to see whether those nations were interested in providing security for Kuwaiti tankers.
AMERICA’S ASSESSMENT AND POLICY FORMULATION
Soviet diplomats responded by saying that Kuwaiti tankers could be reflagged
and would receive Soviet naval protection by doing little more than hoisting
the hammer and sickle. The American request wended its way through the U.S.
State Department slowly. After SS President McKinley avoided being boarded and
searched, as Taylor had been in January 1986, the Department of Defense (DoD)
must have felt that it had solved the Gulf ’s freedom-of-navigation problem, at
least for itself. The hull insurance market was reeling, but, with most premiums
backed by Lloyd’s of London, this was primarily a British business problem. Operation STAUNCH continued, fitfully. AWACS radar planes of the ELF-1 mission
continued their monotonous surveillance flights, and U.S. warships occasionally
plied the Gulf and visited their tiny base in Bahrain. Certainly, the Iran-Iraq War
was a tragedy, and the United States clearly had tilted (although not by official
policy) toward Iraq, but there did not seem to be reason to intervene militarily
over Gulf maritime traffic beyond escorting U.S.-flagged vessels.
In fact, the oil markets scarcely registered the uptick of shipping attacks in
the Gulf. In one way, Iran helped depress the flight of oil. Most of its crude was
exported through oil terminals on Kharg Island, a perennial favorite for Iraqi air
strikes. Iran offered steep discounts for companies willing to fuel up at Kharg,
and even self-insured tankers for the period that they were loading. Oil prices
had plunged since the heady days of the 1970s, when the Gulf states posted
record profits and the West, particularly America, feared the Arab “oil weapon”
in the shape of an embargo. Market forces fueled investments in oil exploration
and efficiency in the 1970s, and by the early 1980s prices dropped. By November
1986, the world was less than a year away from the introduction of the Brent spot
market, a benchmark created on the basis of crude oil extracted from the North
Sea that was to compete with the industry standard of West Texas Intermediate
(WTI). Brent’s arrival indicated new abundance and a shift in the world oil market’s center of gravity. The futures market for WTI, a benchmark for crude oil,
started 1986 at twenty-six dollars per barrel; by Monday, 3 November—the first
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trading day after the GCC meeting and Kuwait’s failed attempt to hammer out a
deal on tanker security—WTI had fallen to $14.71.24
After 3 November, the U.S. government had even fewer reasons to focus on
the tanker war in the Gulf. On that day, As Shiraa (The Sail), a Lebanese newspaper, published a story stating that the United States was shipping weapons to
Iran despite having sanctions against that country.25 Further revelations showed
that the proceeds from these sales were used to fund freedom fighters battling
Nicaragua’s communist government, in circumvention of Congress’s Boland
Amendment. The Iran-Contra scandal had broken, and its revelation harmed
America’s standing worldwide, especially among Arab nations, who bridled at the
superpower’s duplicity.26 Rear Admiral Harold J. Bernsen, USN, commander of
Middle East naval forces, learned of the scandal during a meeting with a Lebanese
defense official: “When I walked in the door, I realized I was in trouble,” the admiral recalled. In the course of a severe dressing-down, the official told Bernsen,
“[Y]ou can tell all of your buddies that they might as well not come around here
anymore.”27 Handling international and domestic blowback absorbed the attention of Reagan’s national security staff, ensuring that Kuwait’s request remained
second-page news for a while.
In contrast to the Soviets’ quick and unequivocal response, the U.S. State Department, after consulting with the U.S. Coast Guard, relayed a litany of requirements to the Kuwaitis. These included that (1) reflagged vessels must be owned
by a U.S. person, via a company incorporated in the United States; (2) vessels
must be inspected by the U.S. Coast Guard for safety, to ensure, for instance,
that they had the proper number of fire extinguishers on board; (3) vessels must
have an American master during operation; and (4) vessels must have American
names. While initially cool to the prospect of reflagging, U.S. administration
officials, particularly Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, came to like
the idea, as it would counter Soviet and Iranian objectives simultaneously while
protecting U.S. oil supplies.
Weinberger, an avowed anticommunist, took Kuwaiti overtures to the Soviets
seriously. Given the free world’s dependence on the Gulf ’s oil, he considered an
increased Soviet presence there threatening, later stating, “I was, and still am,
convinced that it was not in our interest for Soviet forces to move into an area
so vital to us. . . . We in the West need the Gulf ’s oil resources; the Soviets are
more than self-sufficient in oil. Their position in the Gulf, should they achieve
a vital presence there, could only be one of denial toward us. They would gain a
tremendous strategic advantage I did not want them to have.”28 American defense
planners did not want to open the Strait of Hormuz to the Soviet navy one inch.
Weinberger dismissed claims that his enthusiasm for the reflagging constituted
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the United States being “played” by the Soviets. Oil fueled the free world’s economy, and U.S. strategists loathed the thought of the Soviets being in a position to
interdict its movement.
Admiral Crowe also concurred with the reflagging plan. While he agreed that
Weinberger’s dual objectives were sound, the chairman thought that relationship
building justified the action; “it seemed to me that reflagging would go a long way
toward mending our fences in the region.”29 Crowe had experience working in the
Middle East and had participated in negotiating basing rights for the U.S. Navy in
Bahrain in the 1970s. Additionally, Crowe hinted in his memoirs that ideational
factors—a visceral antipathy for Iran—may have affected his support. The USN
ships already in the Gulf witnessed many of Iran’s attacks on neutral shipping.
These captains did not see a blockaded Iran striking back at Arabs smuggling
war matériel into Iraq; they only heard calls for help on the radio as Iranian ships
attacked merchantmen and observed the aftermath of damaged ships bearing the
flags and crews of U.S. allies. Historian Harold Wise captured the sentiment of
USN sailors prior to EARNEST WILL.
One Iranian ship . . . named Sabalan, gained a notorious reputation for these activities. The captain of Sabalan, known as Captain Nasty to Americans, would board
tankers bound for Kuwait, Iraq, or Saudi Arabia, and pretend to carry out a friendly
inspection . . . then, once the charade was over, Captain Nasty would order an attack
on his defenseless prey. Often, Captain Nasty would send a parting message by radio
to his victim and say “Have a nice day.” . . . Many times, American ships watched
helplessly as both sides [Iran and Iraq] left merchants and tankers in flames.30

Stories such as that of Captain Nasty would have been related to the Navy
ships’ local commander, Admiral Bernsen, and likely upward in the chain of
command to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Crowe. Crowe may have
had Sabalan in mind when he recalled his feelings toward Iranian conduct in
the Gulf: “During my recent Gulf visit I had heard firsthand from the Middle
East Force’s commanders and men about the unprovoked and murderous attacks
they were witnessing. They were a frustrated group of sailors; they hated to have
to restrain themselves while atrocities were carried out in front of their eyes.”31
Neither Crowe’s nor Weinberger’s memoirs comment on Iraq’s also-murderous
and equally illegal use of chemical weapons against civilians. While offshore
balancing, oil supply, and loyalty to local allies were important, subconsciously
he may have viewed the Iranians’ real crimes as threefold. First, they had held
Americans hostage—American diplomats in Tehran and other American citizens
held by Hezbollah in Lebanon. Second, they gloated over America’s military failure during the hostage rescue mission. Third, by attacking neutral shipping with
impunity, they made the Persian Gulf an area of lawlessness, and by extension
made the American naval forces on hand look powerless.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss2/8
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As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Crowe was the highestranking military officer in the nation. He also was, by statute, the president’s military adviser. However, he was outside the chain of command for military operations; those plans ran through Secretary Weinberger. So while Admiral Crowe’s
recommendation carried considerable weight, Secretary Weinberger spoke with
the official DoD voice on reflagging.
The reflagging proposal was debated within the U.S. National Security Council (NSC) interagency process. DoD and the NSC were for reflagging, while the
State Department was against it. President Reagan concurred with the DoD/NSC
position. On 17 March 1987, Admiral Crowe delivered America’s formal offer
to Kuwait’s emir, Sheikh Jabir al-Ahmad al-Sabah, to escort KOTC’s oil tankers,
either under their Kuwaiti flags or as properly reflagged American ships.32
Around the same time, the administration alerted Congress to its intentions.
The reflagging would not require extra appropriations. Although the actual
exchange of flags would be done “by the book,” according to U.S. Coast Guard
regulations, DoD tried to expedite certain steps. Administration lawyers felt they
did not need legislation to authorize the escort. The 1973 War Powers Resolution
had set tough notification and approval requirements on a president regarding
the use of military forces, but Weinberger thought these approval procedures
did not apply to the reflagging; and Reagan, like all presidents since its passing, considered the War Powers Resolution unconstitutional. Admiral Crowe
recalled congressional opposition during hearings on the reflagging as intense.
Weinberger, a career politician and former legislator, considered it desultory
posturing by opposition Democrats. The Iran-Contra scandal was a much bigger
deal for Congress. Senator John G. Tower had released a report on the scandal
on 25 February 1987, identifying administration errors. The Tower Commission
had settled nothing, however. Another congressional entity with a wider scope
and subpoena power was authorized in January 1987, and it was preparing for
hearings during the reflagging debate.33
On 15 May 1987, KOTC lawyers finished the paperwork that created Chesapeake Shipping Inc., a corporation based in Dover, Delaware, that had “no
employees, with ‘offices’ consisting of a mail drop at another company that
specialized in dummy corporations, and controlling assets (the tankers) valued
at approximately $350 million.”34 At this point, Operation EARNEST WILL was
ready to start.
However, two days later an Iraqi Mirage jet hit USS Stark, a frigate, with two
missiles. Stark had been conducting routine patrolling activities in the central
Persian Gulf when it was hit. Heroic crew efforts extinguished fires and saved the
ship from sinking, but the impact and conflagration killed thirty-seven sailors.
Congress was livid. On 22 May 1987, the Senate demanded more information on
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020
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EARNEST WILL, and by the next day a congressional delegation of investigators
had arrived at the U.S. naval base in Bahrain to interview survivors. Iraq immediately apologized. The Navy investigation assessed the incident to have been an
accident—the Mirage had been looking for shipping bound for Iran.
Stark had missile countermeasures, but had not defended itself, because it
did not see the Iraqi aircraft as a threat. The problem was as much cognitive as
technological. Naval tacticians long had feared combat in the congested Persian
Gulf; American ships were designed for combat in open oceans. Admiral Crowe,
among others, noted that encounters in the Gulf ’s confines left little time for humans to interpret data, identify a threat, and take countermeasures. Because of
this, America’s aircraft carriers remained in the open waters of the Indian Ocean
for the duration of EARNEST WILL.
While the crew of USS Stark made mistakes, the Iraqi Mirage pilot was grossly
negligent. He carried sophisticated radar and other sensors, yet did not identify
that his target was a 4,100-ton Perry-class frigate instead of his desired prey: a
two-hundred-thousand-ton very large crude carrier (i.e., a supertanker).
Despite this fact, America quickly blamed Iran for the tragedy. The day after
the attack Reagan stated during a press conference that “the villain in this piece
really is Iran.”35 On 20 May 1987, Secretary of State George P. Shultz wrote to
Congress, “Quite apart from the Iraqi attack on the USS Stark, Iran continues
publicly and privately to threaten shipping in the Gulf. It is this basic Iranian
threat to the free flow of oil and to the principle of freedom of navigation which
is unacceptable.”36 The anti-Iranian narrative continued.
Nothing had changed to tilt U.S. policy in the region away from supporting
Iraq in strategy or narrative. On 16 June 1987, Michael Armacost, the Under
Secretary of State for Political Affairs, addressed the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee to justify EARNEST WILL. Regarding the Iran-Iraq War, he testified
that “[w]e do not wish to see an Iranian victory in that terrible conflict.” Yet in the
very next sentence he stressed, “Nevertheless, the United States remains formally
neutral in the war.”37
Because of the Stark incident, America’s “neutral intervention” now grew in
scope. Congress insisted that the Navy establish robust rules of engagement. The
rules would, for instance, have allowed Stark to order the Mirage to change course
as it approached or to open fire on it if it refused. The Navy now planned to send
more ships to the Gulf as well. Weinberger told General George B. Crist, USMC,
commander of the EARNEST WILL JTF, to ask for any asset he felt he needed to
conduct the operation.38 In June, Weinberger convinced the Saudis to let the
EARNEST WILL JTF connect the radar feeds from the ELF-1 surveillance aircraft
to its naval ships, giving the United States better situational awareness.
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The Reagan administration initiated a strategic communications campaign
to address congressional opposition and political posturing. Under Secretary
Armacost and Secretary Weinberger both delivered lengthy statements to congressional committees on U.S. policy. In justifying EARNEST WILL and Stark’s
sacrifice, the statements described strategic concerns of encroaching Soviet
influence in the Gulf as well as economic ones regarding free flow of commerce.
Oil, of course, was the key element of this commerce. Armacost testified that
“[t]he unimpeded flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz is a vital interest.”39
Vital interests generally are understood to be those over which America is prepared to fight. A subsequent national security document defined them as “those
directly connected to the survival, safety, and vitality of our nation.”40 Armacost
reiterated the Carter Doctrine’s affirmation that “[a]n attempt by any outside
force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on
the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be
repelled by any means necessary, including military force.”41 EARNEST WILL was
the Carter Doctrine’s first explicit test.
In addition to the Soviets’ geopolitical threat, America had a collective psychological fear of oil shortages. President Reagan addressed this concern during
a 29 May 1987 radio address. In justifying EARNEST WILL, Reagan recalled the
1970s oil shocks and their deleterious effects on the U.S. economy. He argued that
“[t]his could happen again if Iran and the Soviet Union were able to impose their
will upon the friendly Arab States of the Persian Gulf, and Iran was allowed to
block the free passage of neutral shipping.”42
AN UNDECLARED WAR WITH IRAN
Iran did not acquiesce to the convoys’ presence when the larger and more aggressive JTF started EARNEST WILL. The Iranians continued to strike neutral
shipping with aircraft and ships. They directly challenged the United States by
laying mines along convoy routes (while denying constantly that they were doing
so). The Iranian navy acted aggressively toward U.S. forces supporting the convoy
missions. Three distinct Iranian actions—the mining of SS Bridgeton, the attack
on SS Sea Isle City, and the mining of USS Samuel B. Roberts—prompted the U.S.
military to retaliate against Iran with military force.
The first EARNEST WILL convoy did not take place until 22 July 1987, when
USS Kidd and USS Fox escorted SS Bridgeton, an ultralarge crude carrier that displaced four hundred thousand tons. Bridgeton, nominally homeported in Philadelphia, had until shortly before this convoy been the Kuwaiti ship Al-Rekkah. In
a bit of irony, Kidd, a state-of-the-art destroyer designed for work in the tropics,
originally had been ordered and bought by prerevolutionary Iran. After the shah’s
ousting and the cessation of weapons transfers, the U.S. Navy took the ship.
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The convoy started inauspiciously: Bridgeton hit a mine on 24 July 1987, while
transiting the Gulf to pick up crude oil in Kuwait. The explosion punctured the
tanker but did not stop it. As if it were not enough that its escorts could not protect it, Kidd and Fox escaped the minefield by having Bridgeton lead while the
warships followed in its wake; sailors reckoned that a four-hundred-thousandton supertanker in ballast is nearly impossible to sink with mines, while a 7,900ton destroyer loaded with fuel and ammunition was at considerable risk.
The Navy reacted to the Bridgeton mining by launching an offensive to find
and destroy the Iranian minelayer. Washington reinforced the EARNEST WILL JTF
with special operations forces (SOFs) and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets that could find and track the civilian Iranian ships suspected of
laying mines surreptitiously. On 21 September 1987, they succeeded. SOF helicopters, working at night, caught the fishing ship Iran Ajr in the act. U.S. SOFs
captured Iran Ajr in a daring raid and the Navy videotaped its deadly cargo for
the world to see.
On 16 October 1987, an Iranian Silkworm missile hit SS Sea Isle City. The
United States responded by destroying an oil platform.
When Samuel B. Roberts hit a mine on 14 April 1988, the United States ratcheted up its response. Unlike Bridgeton, which survived with a small hole, “Sammy
B” burned, flooded, and almost sank. In retaliation, Admiral Crowe ordered the
JTF to destroy two oil platforms and a frigate: “sink the Sabalan,” Crowe cabled
the commander; “put it on the bottom.”43 In a one-day offensive code-named
Operation PRAYING MANTIS, the EARNEST WILL JTF destroyed the platforms,
several speedboats, and damaged Sabalan. Unsatisfied with a partial victory, a
surface task force located the frigate Joshan. USS Wainwright signaled the Joshan
crew, “Stop and abandon ship, I intend to sink you.”44 Joshan responded with a
missile that missed its target; USS Simpson responded with four that did not.
Simpson’s salvo, along with a flurry of gunfire from other ships in the task force,
destroyed Joshan and earned Simpson its rare distinction as a ship killer.
Amazingly, Iranian provocations continued until the Iran Air Flight 655 tragedy. On 3 July 1988, USS Vincennes, while under attack by Iranian speedboats,
mistook a civilian Airbus airliner for an attacking fighter aircraft and shot it
down. The United States paid sixty-one million dollars in compensation while
denying guilt for the incident. Vice President George H. W. Bush summed up
America’s position regarding the downing of the Airbus during a speech at the
UNSC. “The critical issue confronting this body is not the how and why of Iran
Air 655. It is the continuing refusal of the Government of the Islamic Republic
of Iran to comply with Resolution 598, to negotiate an end to the war with Iraq,
and to cease its acts of aggression against neutral shipping in the Persian Gulf.”45
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Iran garnered little sympathy at the United Nations. America’s unofficial war
in the Persian Gulf was preceded by the United States blaming Iran for a mistaken
attack launched by the Iraqis. The war then concluded, in a sense, with the United
States blaming Iran for the mistaken attack against Iran Air 655. There were no
more major engagements after Vincennes’s incident with the speedboats and the
downing of Iran Air Flight 655. By July 1988, Iran was defeated thoroughly on
the battlefield. The Vincennes episode and PRAYING MANTIS both coincided with
Iraqi victories. An exhausted Iran sued for peace later in July—which Supreme
Leader Ali Khamenei likened to “drinking hemlock for me.”46 EARNEST WILL
continued escorting tankers quietly until December 1989.47
TWO FACTORS OF EXPLANATION
The Scourge of Communism and Reagan’s Response: Ideological Drivers Spark
a Great-Power Competition
The threat of the Soviet Union involving itself in the Persian Gulf proved to be
the most powerful driver of American foreign policy preceding EARNEST WILL.
The fear that the Soviet Union would escort Kuwaiti oil tankers and thereby
gain a foothold in the Persian Gulf—the fuel tank of the free world’s oil-based
economy—motivated the United States to counter the Soviets’ offer. The Soviet
threat mobilized Washington in a way that years of carnage, attacks on neutral
shipping, including oil supplies, and deep-seated hatred of the Iranian government could not. Public statements from DoD and the State Department as well
as President Reagan’s own comments cited the centrality of the Soviet communist
threat in justifying EARNEST WILL. There is little chance that this was posturing
simply for public consumption; the fear of communism in the United States (and
particularly in the Republican Party) was strong and long-standing, and anticommunism was a central tenet of the Reagan administration.
From the start, Marxist-Leninist Moscow and laissez-faire Washington had
diametrically opposed worldviews. Lenin summed up the Manichaean struggle
as follows: “As long as capitalism and socialism exist, we cannot live in peace: in
the end, one or the other will triumph—a funeral dirge will be sung either over
the Soviet Republic or over world capitalism.”48 Reagan was very much aware of
and in agreement with Lenin’s view on the dichotomy; in 1983, during a speech
to the National Association of Evangelicals, he likened the communist leadership
to a demon depicted in the C. S. Lewis novel The Screwtape Letters, and called the
USSR an “evil empire.”
After an alliance of convenience during World War II, this conflict morphed
into great-power competition and solidified into the Cold War. The struggle’s
early phases were marked by the Truman Doctrine and the policy of containment,
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both of which sought to box in the Soviet Union and respond to provocations in
countries such as Greece, Turkey, and South Korea. A rebuilt Europe and, especially, a unified Germany were great sources of potential power. Superpowers
contended over them, as they did countries on the periphery such as Greece,
Turkey, Israel, and Kuwait.
The Persian Gulf was an active Cold War theater. America’s first brush with
oil shortage, the 1973 embargo, was driven by great-power politics. America’s
support for Israel during the 1973 Yom Kippur War that so inflamed Arab sentiments was part of a balancing act against the Soviet client states of Egypt and
Syria. During EARNEST WILL, America was in Bahrain, as a tenant at a small naval base, because it had subsumed Britain’s regional security responsibilities after
British forces withdrew in 1971. Laissez-faire America could have relied on the
free market to keep oil flowing, but it decided that it was important to prevent a
hegemon from taking charge in the region. So it put in place its small naval presence and promoted the twin-pillar policies of supporting rivals Iran and Saudi
Arabia to police the area.
Even the nation’s core strategy for the Middle East, the Carter Doctrine, is at its
heart about great-power politics. The shah fled Iran in January 1979; the Carter
Doctrine was not promulgated until the January 1980 State of the Union address.
Iranian destabilization was a critical foreign policy problem, but the precipitating
event for the speech was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979.
The Soviets are mentioned thirty-two times in Carter’s 1980 speech, Iran only six.
America’s pledge to prevent Soviet hegemony in the Persian Gulf was consonant
with its grand strategy of containment and its regional strategy of keeping the
Soviets away from critical resources. John Mearsheimer offers Reagan’s execution
of the Carter Doctrine / containment as a successful example of offshore balancing, as it relied primarily on proxies and, when needed, used expeditionary forces
rather than those stationed at permanent forward bases.49
In this context, it should not be surprising that a threat of Soviet involvement
in the Gulf, however slight, prompted an American response. Kuwait previously
had been a British protectorate; although not a liberal nation, it previously had
been in the American orbit. The Islamic Revolution shifted Iran to the neutral
column, and this concerned the United States greatly. Also, while the United
States faced (conventional) parity or (nuclear) mutually assured destruction on
potential battlefields such as those in Korea or central Europe, it had the potential
to exert hegemony in the Persian Gulf theater. Reagan greatly expanded the Navy,
to nearly six hundred ships. It could support EARNEST WILL and more, without
removing aircraft carrier battle groups from critical sea-lanes in the Atlantic and
Pacific. In contrast, the Soviet navy’s strength was its submarines. Its surface craft
were few and could not operate for long in the Gulf, since they lacked forward
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operating bases. While the Soviets lacked staying power, America could use its
bases in Bahrain and Diego Garcia (the latter in the Indian Ocean) to support its
military escort strategy and political objectives of boxing out the Soviets.
Secretary of Defense Weinberger unequivocally identified Soviet involvement
as a threat the United States must avoid, even if it played into Kuwait’s hands. The
position of Secretary of State Shultz was less hard-line; he supported EARNEST
WILL, but accepted the possibility of some minimal Soviet naval presence in the
Gulf, to avoid giving the Kuwaitis what they wanted. Still, his position was clear.
“The idea of the Soviets playing a key maritime role in the Gulf had no appeal to
us.”50 He describes the reflagging as one of the few times he and Weinberger saw
eye to eye on a military matter.
The Reagan administration’s official rationale on reflagging, delivered to Congress by Under Secretary Armacost, listed protecting Kuwait from Iran first and
prevention of Soviet influence second. Yet this ignores the fact that neither the
United States nor the world oil markets cared one bit about Kuwait’s predicament
until the country approached the Soviets—and let the United States know about
it—in the fall of 1987.
EARNEST WILL was classic offensive realist offshore balancing. The United
States kept the Soviet Union and Iran out, and Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in,
while avoiding a permanent large garrison in the Gulf (its base in Bahrain was
tiny). Reagan’s desire to confront perceived Soviet expansion more aggressively
does much to explain the foreign policy decision to engage in EARNEST WILL.
Its explanatory power stands in contrast to the proximate reason for Kuwait’s
predicament. Protection of oil flows, as shown in the next section, played little
strategic role in EARNEST WILL, despite the strategic proclamations of the Carter
Doctrine and the administration’s communication efforts to remind Congress of
its importance to the U.S. economy.
The Global Commons and Protecting Oil Flow—
a Mediocre Explanation of Events
In his memoir, Secretary of Defense Weinberger justified EARNEST WILL as an
effort to keep Soviet influence out of the Gulf. However, while he mentioned the
Soviet threat during his June 1987 testimony to Congress, in this public forum
oil and economic arguments took center stage—he mentioned them at least six
times. The Persian Gulf was a vital interest, he testified. “Our ability to continue
to develop economically and to maintain the way of life we are accustomed to
depends on our unimpeded access to this oil.”51
President Reagan’s messaging during a 29 May 1987 press briefing matched
that of his Defense Secretary. Reagan’s remarks occurred shortly after the Iraqi
missile hit USS Stark and one week after the Senate formally requested more
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information on Operation EARNEST WILL. Reagan hits the domestic implications
of the Gulf crisis hard and early.
It may be easy for some, after a near record 54-month economic recovery, to forget
just how critical the Persian Gulf is to our national security. But I think everyone in
this room and everyone hearing my voice now can remember the woeful impact of
the Middle East oil crisis of a few years ago: the endless, demoralizing gas lines; the
shortages; the rationing; the escalating energy prices; the double-digit inflation; and
the enormous dislocation that shook our economy to its foundations.52

Yet while the public messaging around EARNEST WILL focused on the resource
narrative, neither politicians’ memoirs nor military planning accounts show an
immediate or quantifiable concern over oil access. Despite quotations of barrels exported, forecasts of America’s future reliance on Gulf oil, and evocations
(implicit and explicit) of the 1973 Arab oil embargo, oil was cheap in 1987, and
concern—on the part of both policy makers and the public and congressmen they
sought to influence—was ideational.
Domestic fears of oil shortages dated back to the 1973 Arab oil embargo, which
Arab oil producers had imposed in retaliation for America’s steadfast support of
Israel during the Yom Kippur War. Although the actual supply disruption was
neither complete nor lengthy, it shocked the country. The 1979 Iranian Revolution brought a new series of oil shocks and spectacular price hikes—from fourteen to thirty-five dollars per barrel by 1981.53 But the shocks also encouraged exploration and technology. By the time of Operation EARNEST WILL, oil was cheap
despite the blockade of Umm Qasr and the occasional sinking of tankers bearing
Kuwaiti, Saudi, or Iranian crude destined for the world market. Yet American
consumers remained psychologically vulnerable to the threat of oil price spikes.
The Iran-Iraq War had little long-term effect on global oil prices. Iraq’s initial
invasion did cause a price spike; a barrel of crude rose from fifty-three dollars in
September 1980 to sixty-three dollars by February 1981, a 19 percent increase,
as Iran and Iraq assiduously bombed and shelled each other’s oil infrastructure.54
But the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (i.e., OPEC) replaced
all crude oil taken off the market by the war within a few months of the war’s
onset, and prices dropped to prewar levels by mid-1982. During this period,
America’s concerns were geopolitical more than economic. Iran was an Islamic
republic seeking to export revolution, and the United States tilted against Iran as
a result. Iraq escaped censure in the UNSC even though it was the aggressor, and
the United States launched Operation STAUNCH against Iran.
The expansion of the conflict into the tanker war likewise did not move the
markets. Iranian and Iraqi oil exports actually expanded slightly when the tanker
war began.55 The market situation was unchanged by 1986 the year Kuwait grew
concerned about its fleet. Prices fluctuated quite a bit in 1986 (price fluctuations
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on the futures market averaged forty cents per day, compared with a historical
average of twenty cents per day from 1983 to 2015), but when Kuwait made its
overtures to the superpowers in November, a futures contract for a barrel stood
at $14.71—far below the price at the beginning of the year (2 January) of $25.56.56
To be sure, insurance rates rose fivefold during this time. At one point, underwriters judged the Gulf to be more dangerous than sea-lanes during World War
II.57 At times it was impossible to insure a supertanker filling up at Iran’s Kharg
Island; Iran had to self-insure. Yet this was a problem for the sailors. And for the
insurance market; Lloyd’s of London controlled most of the premiums, but 10
Downing Street made no offer to Kuwait to protect its tankers, nor did it call for
an international escorting scheme. Once EARNEST WILL started, Secretary Weinberger asked the British whether they would like to participate, but America’s
greatest ally demurred.58
Geography made Kuwait’s risks political and unique. The country sought a
political solution to the risk, and America’s response, while tied to Kuwait’s oil
wealth, was underpinned by geopolitical competition first and market fundamentals second. EARNEST WILL would not have happened without the oil, but
the oil market did not drive American policy makers. An analysis of oil market
fundamentals during the tanker war, reinforced by the silence on the oil situation
in key memoirs, makes it clear that arguments about oil in front of Congress addressed theoretical concerns and amounted to debating points aimed at getting
congressional approval.
Oil was a factor in EARNEST WILL, but it was a nested factor. If Kuwait chose
the Soviet Union to escort all eleven of its tankers, it might spark a permanent
Soviet presence in the Gulf. This might embolden the Soviets to seize control of
the Gulf one day, even though doing so would require incorporating several large
countries (in terms of both population and geography) in an opposed campaign.
If this were successful, the Soviets—a net oil exporter already—might decide to
keep the extra oil off the market (although it had exported oil throughout its
history, even during the 1920s—when it was a pariah state). This would have a
serious effect on the U.S. economy, as had previous regional disruptions in 1973,
1978, and 1979. Still, it is critical to understand that this is a nested factor, as in a
matryoshka doll. The Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Energy
may have been paying close attention to the oil flow during the tanker war, but
they did not raise an alarm. Oil security may have helped sell the deployment, but
the rationale behind the deployment was power geopolitics.
Basil Liddell Hart wrote that the objective of war is to secure a better peace.59 In
that sense, EARNEST WILL succeeded in this episode of offshore balancing during
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the long Cold War. America kept the Soviets out; the Kuwaitis in; and the Iranians
down, to the extent that they sued for peace within a year of the operation’s onset.
First, the JTF protected the KOTC’s reflagged (and therefore American) supertankers. While the Soviets did make a show of sending a few warships to the Gulf,
they did not attempt to challenge U.S. regional hegemony.
Second, EARNEST WILL began to bring the mercurial Kuwaiti royal family into
America’s orbit. This process would be complete three years later when, following
DESERT STORM, the world’s most powerful democracy liberated the tiny country
and reinstalled its royal family as rulers without a whisper about potential political reforms, such as moving toward a representative government. Additionally,
the reflagging effort improved U.S. standing with GCC members, particularly
Saudi Arabia. GCC members previously had been disappointed with America’s
inability to approve arms-transfer deals for sophisticated weapons its members
demanded. Also, America’s strategic approach in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and
Lebanon had given some nations the impression that the United States was a
fickle ally, likely to cut and run. The fact that the United States stayed in the Gulf
after the casualties of the USS Stark incident, and that its sailors obviously had
no compunctions against closing with and destroying the Iranian navy, renewed
the value of American military friendship in the region.
Third, E ARNEST W ILL contributed to defeating Iran. The second half of
EARNEST WILL coincided with a spectacular series of Iraqi victories. Iran’s navy,
with its missile-armed frigates and covert minelayers, was one of the country’s
comparative advantages over Iraq. But EARNEST WILL neutralized it, along with
any hope Tehran had that a maritime-interdiction campaign would isolate Iraq
or convince GCC members to deny Baghdad vital financial support. The JTF’s
largest operation against the Iranian navy, Operation PRAYING MANTIS, was by
coincidence launched simultaneously with Iraq’s massive ground attack to retake
the strategic al-Faw peninsula. This reinforced the existing attitude in Tehran
that Washington and Baghdad were coordinating in their war against the Islamic
republic. After Vincennes’s tragic downing of an Iranian civilian Airbus, Iran
quickly sued for peace. In his letter to UN secretary general Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, Supreme Leader Khamenei identified the aircraft’s downing as an example of
widening the war and a direct cause of his desire to offer peace terms.60
The EARNEST WILL episode suggests that the principles of strategy (such as
containment) matter, but that specific foreign policy formulations will require
improvisation within strategic confines. When the Kuwaitis approached the
United States with the reflagging proposal, American policy makers did not
respond from the Carter Doctrine playbook, and they did not approach the
problem as rational actors strictly seeking the optimal response to the royal family’s overture. They did, however, act within the framework of the decades-old
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strategy of containment. America’s desire to stymie the Soviet Union and keep
it from obtaining hegemony in the Persian Gulf proved a powerful catalyst to
get the United States involved. Still, while the specific strategy framework was
preexisting, the details of the American response were ad hoc. Policy makers
improvised actions that were specific to the tanker threat’s time and place. Kuwait
seized the initiative in the reflagging episode by making simultaneous overtures
for assistance to both Washington and Moscow. When American leaders formed
a policy to address this development, that policy was shaped by their notions of
containment, their fear of Soviet influence, and their antipathy toward Iran. The
United States responded forcefully to the threat of a few Soviet escorts in the Gulf
even though it had done little regarding all the Iranian navy had done up to that
point, including boarding a U.S. ship.
During any future inevitable policy improvisations, policy makers would do
well to drill down into their key assumptions. For instance, oil is indeed critical to
the world economy, but for all the success of EARNEST WILL there is no evidence
the operation was necessary to secure the flow of crude oil through the Strait of
Hormuz or a decent price for it on the world spot and futures markets; macroeconomic factors far outweighed the JTF’s efforts in this regard. EARNEST WILL
was, in one sense, a subsidy for Kuwaiti crude—another point that policy makers
should ponder when they determine future interventions in the Persian Gulf or
other places rich in commodities.
However, in the greater context of containment, EARNEST WILL succeeded,
and it did so without creating an open-ended military commitment. In an era
of strained resources and multiple theaters vying for attention, policy makers
should ensure that, given the uncertainty of any military action, capabilities are
well matched to objective ends. As Richard Betts has observed, “strategy fails
when means prove insufficient to the ends.”61 EARNEST WILL paid off because of
military overmatch and America’s strong commitment to containing an existential threat—factors that are not always present.
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